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Patrick Galdieri

Protecting Bloggers: The Federal Media Shield is Actually a Sword
Section I
Introduction
In recent years, various federal media shield bills encountered inevitable criticism which
ultimately led to their demise. That criticism has largely centered on definitional concerns in
light of evolving online entities, perhaps most notably blogs. While internet premised arguments
against a federal media shield once held merit, they are no longer convincing, as Congress has
modified the legislation.
The particular issue discussed in this paper is that the Free Flow of Information Act of
2013 (hereinafter, “FFIA”) appropriately protects bloggers’ confidentiality right for their
sources. This subject is particularly germane following the Senate Judiciary Committee’s recent
FFIA amendment approval which delineates the bill’s scope of coverage. That decision elicited
conflicting responses from the internet community, ranging from staunch disapproval to ardent
support. This paper takes the position that the FFIA as amended overcomes prior concerns,
protecting bloggers and the online community alike.
This paper will address the various topics demonstrating the FFIA’s protection of
bloggers in the following order: Section II will discuss the historical progression towards a
federal media shield, Section III will discuss arguments purporting definitional concerns
regarding coverage of bloggers with rebuttals to those arguments, Section IV will discuss recent
examples of unprotected bloggers with arguments that the FFIA would have provided protection,
and Section V will discuss media shield laws’ impact on bloggers at the state level.
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Section II
The Progression towards a Federal Media Shield
There is no federal statute to protect a reporter’s qualified or conditional right to refuse to
reveal confidential sources.1 Consequently, the First Amendment governs the extent of the
reporters’ privilege under federal law.2 The Supreme Court of the United States has confronted
the issue of “whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”3 In Branzburg, a
reporter wrote a detailed article involving observations of two drug dealers manufacturing
drugs.4 The reporter was then subpoenaed by a grand jury and refused to identify the two drug
dealers discussed in the article.5

The Supreme Court rejected the reporter’s argument of

privilege under state law and required that he appear before the grand jury and answer
questioning.6 Still, Branzburg suggested federal enactment of a reporters’ privilege, specifically
providing that:
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory
newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules
as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and,
equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may
dictate.7
Branzburg noted that there is “merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment
limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the
relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas.”8

1

See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 226 (2011).
Id.
3
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 667-668.
6
Id. at 709.
7
Id. at 706.
8
Id.
2
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Moreover,

Branzburg recognized that the First Amendment “comprehends every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”9
Following Branzburg, several federal appeals courts acknowledged a conditional
reporters’ privilege in varying contexts such as libel suits and civil actions to which the reporter
was not a party.10 However, the turn of the century paralleled federal courts’ growing
apprehension to identify a constitutionally based reporters’ privilege. 11 Representative of such
apprehension was Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner’s opinion in which he provided that
“[w]e do not see why there needs to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the
documents or other evidence sought is a journalist.”12 That 2003 opinion signified the federal
courts’ transition to reject a constitutionally based reporters’ privilege.13 So, the news media
turned to Congress for a reporters’ shield law as federal actions increasingly imposed fines and
jail time.14
Over the last ten years, several media shield bills have died in Congress. 15 But there is
presently a media shield bill, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 (hereinafter “FFIA”),
which recently passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and now awaits a full vote in the Senate.16
The FFIA’s stated purpose is “[t]o maintain the free flow of information to the public by
providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons

9

Id. at 704.
See Jane E. Kirtley, Mask, Shield, and Sword: Should the Journalist's Privilege Protect the Identity of Anonymous
Posters to News Media Websites?, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1478, 1500 (2010).
11
Id. at 1501.
12
Id (quoting McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003)).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 1502.
15
See Emily Bazelon, Better Than No Shield At All, Slate.com (Sep. 24, 2013, 1:23 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/09/media_shield_law_matt_drudge_is_wrong_
the_senate_bill_is_pretty_good.html.
16
See Bazelon, supra note 15.
10
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connected with the news media.”17 The FFIA prohibits any entity or employee of the judicial or
executive branch or an administrative agency of the federal government, in any matter arising
under federal law, from compelling a covered person to testify or produce any document related
to information obtained or created as part of engaging in journalism unless a court makes
specified determinations.18
In both criminal and civil cases, to overcome the prohibition the court is required to make
a determination by a preponderance of the evidence that “the party seeking to compel disclosure
of the protected information has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources of the protected
information.”19
Unique to civil cases, the court must additionally determine by a preponderance of the
evidence that “the protected information sought is essential to the resolution of the matter” and
that “the interest in compelling disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in gathering and
disseminating the information or news at issue and maintaining the free flow of information.”20
Unique to criminal cases, the court must additionally determine by a preponderance of
the evidence that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred” and that
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the protected information sought is essential to the
investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution.”21 Such a determination
shifts the burden to the covered person to show “by clear and convincing evidence that
disclosure of the protected information would be contrary to the public interest, taking into

17

See Tracking the U.S. Congress, GovTrack.us (May 16, 2013),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s987/text.
18
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
19
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
20
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
21
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
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account both the public interest in gathering and disseminating the information or news at issue
and maintaining the free flow of information and the public interest in compelling disclosure.”22
Furthermore, the prohibition does not apply to information “necessary to stop, prevent, or
mitigate a specific case of death, kidnapping, substantial bodily harm, conduct that constitutes a
criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor, and incapacitation or destruction of
critical infrastructure.”23 Finally, the FFIA includes a national security exception. So the
prohibition does not apply if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the
classified information sought would “materially assist the federal government in preventing or
mitigating an act of terrorism or other acts that are reasonably likely to cause significant and
articulable harm to national security.”24
The compromise amendment of the FFIA, which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee
in September 2013, establishes the bill’s definition of “journalist” and “covered journalist.”25 In
other words, the amendment delineates who is protected by the shield. Congress has faced a
great deal of criticism in the past in defining who is covered by the bill in in light of modern
internet reporting. This paper will address the arguments against a federal shield law in the
context of internet entities and will show why the supporting arguments are more persuasive.
Specifically, this paper takes the position that the FFIA, as recently amended, appropriately
protects online entities. Section III will detail that the FFIA’s “covered journalist” definition
provides appropriate protection to bloggers.

22

See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
24
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
25
See Bazelon, supra note 15.
23
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Section III
Bloggers are Protected by the FFIA’s “Covered Journalist” Definition
With respect to the implementation of a federal media shield law, judges, senators, and
witnesses alike have expressed concerns about federal courts defining “journalist” in light of new
avenues of reporting via the internet.26 District of Columbia Circuit Judge Sentelle articulated
the conundrum federal courts face in defining “journalist,” stating that:
Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters employed by
Time Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend
that protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly
newsletter to inform his neighbors, lodge brothers, co-religionists, or coconspirators? Perhaps more to the point today, does the privilege also protect the
proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at his
personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform
whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not? How could one draw a
distinction consistent with the court's vision of a broadly granted personal right?27
Other critics of a federal media shield argue that “faced with this technological moving target…
the doctrine is destined to be mired in definitional difficulties in at least some cases, and likely in
a growing number of them.”28

Those opinions are premised on inconsistent findings of

reporters’ privilege in federal courts varying from broad to narrow classifications of protected
journalists.29 Although the wide spectrum of individuals in the blogosphere poses an obstacle to
federal courts, it is overcome by enacting legislation that focuses on whether the newsgathering
function is performed.
The foregoing reservations about defining “journalist” in light of the amorphous
blogosphere are “unfounded for a federal shield law.”30 Whereas definitional concerns are
26

See James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting A Reasonable Federal Shield Law: A Reply to
Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1291, 1312 (2008).
27
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-1157 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J.,
concurring).
28
See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1221, 1241-1242 (2013).
29
Id. at 1241.
30
See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 26, at 1312.
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understandable, they are inconsequential here if Congress’ definition of covered journalists
focuses on the function being performed.31 Gregg Leslie, Legal Director for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, has stated that Congress should concentrate on
functionality, specifically explaining that “[t]he medium doesn't answer the question. It has to do
more with the function that the person is performing… If the Bloggers' involvement is to report
information to the public and to gather information for that purpose openly then they should be
treated like a journalist.”32

Accordingly, in consideration of continually changing means

spawned by the internet like blogs, Congress can address definitional concerns by delineating
“what the person seeking coverage as a journalist was doing when he or she received the
information being subpoenaed, and not on the medium of communication they used for their
stories, such as blogging.”33
First, the plain language of the FFIA’s definition of “covered journalist” shows such a
focus on the newsgathering function. The September 12, 2013 amendment to the FFIA defines
“covered journalist” as an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity that
disseminates news or information “by means of… news website, mobile application, or other
news or information service… with the primary intent to investigate events and procure
material… in the regular gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing,
editing, reporting, or publishing on such matters.”34
As such, “covered journalist” embraces the functional approach suggested by Gregg
Leslie, overcoming concerns that bloggers are not appropriately protected. Importantly, the

31

Id.
Id (quoting FixYourThinking.com, Are Bloggers Journalists?, http://jackwhispers.blogspot.com/2006/03/arebloggers-journalists-courts-seem.html (Mar. 28, 2006)).
33
Id. at 1313.
34
See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary, Judiciary.Senate.gov (Sep. 12, 2013),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/mediashield/Feinstein/ALB13767.pdf.
32
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bill’s plain language explicitly requires that to qualify for protection, a “covered journalist” must
possess intent to gather news or information and disseminate it to the public.35 Recognizing that
the FFIA’s focus on newsgathering provides protection to deserving bloggers, Kurt Wimmer,
general counsel for the Newspaper Association of America, wrote “[t]rue, the blogger at issue
would have to be practicing journalism – which is the test that bloggers seem to prefer.”36 The
focus on newsgathering is beneficial for bloggers because it is likely that the circumstances
under which a blogger seeks FFIA protection of confidential sources also entail gathering,
recording, or publishing news or information.37
Next, the FFIA contains another avenue to qualify as a “covered journalist” which
likewise applies the functional standard. Under this section, a “covered journalist” is a person
who “at the inception of the process of gathering the news or information sought had the primary
intent to investigate issues or events and procure material in order to disseminate to the public
news or information” and “was an employee, independent contractor, or agent of an entity or
service that disseminates news or information… for any continuous one-year period within the
20 years prior to the relevant date or any continuous three-month period within the 5 years prior
to the relevant date.”38 Additionally, “a student participating in a journalistic medium at an
institution of higher education on the relevant date” is covered.39
This section’s plain language ensures coverage to parties who gather and disseminate
news with reasonably recent and sufficient experience in so doing. For purposes of protecting
freelance and independent bloggers this section crucially allows for the prior experience to be as
35

See Bazelon, supra note 15.
See Kurt Wimmer, The Senate’s media shield bill protects bloggers and they should support it, GigaOM.com
(Sep. 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2013/09/21/the-senates-media-shield-bill-protects-bloggers-and-theyshould-support-it/; See Bazelon, supra note 15.
37
See Wimmer, supra note 36.
38
See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013).
39
See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013).
36
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an independent contractor. Just as important to the blogosphere, this section covers only those
who intend to carry out the newsgathering function. Accordingly, by not tethering this section’s
coverage to just established media outlets, Congress has authorized federal courts to protect
bloggers who have informal but effective work experience performing the newsgathering
function.
The FFIA’s “covered journalist” provision nevertheless has generated polarizing
assessments. For instance, Matt Drudge, creator and editor of news aggregator the Drudge
Report, took to Twitter with sharp criticism of the bill’s amendment, writing that “[g]ov’t
declaring who qualifies for freedom of press in digital age is ridiculous! It belongs to anyone for
any reason. No amendment necessary.”40 Drudge further noted that a “[f]ederal judge once ruled
Drudge ‘is not a journalist, a reporter, or a newsgatherer.’ Millions of readers come a day for
cooking recipes??!”41 Finally, Drudge pointedly disparaged Senator Dianne Feinstein for her
remarks supporting the amendment, writing that ““[c]omments from Sen. Feinstein yesterday on
who's a reporter were disgusting. 17-year old 'blogger' is as important as Wolf Blitzer. Fascist!”42
Matt Drudge’s ridicule of the government defining “covered journalist” is likely derived
from his experience in federal court. In Blumenthal v. Drudge, the United States District Court
was confronted with a defamation action involving statements Drudge published on the
internet.43 There, Blumenthal alleged that Drudge made defamatory remarks on America Online
through his electronic publication, the Drudge Report, a gossip column “focusing on gossip from
Hollywood and Washington D.C.44 Drudge’s purported defamatory statements provided that
Blumenthal, recently appointed Assistant to President Obama, had previously abused his
40

See Matt Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013), https://twitter.com/DRUDGE.
See Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013).
42
See Drudge, Twitter (Sep. 13, 2013).
43
See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998).
44
Id. at 46-47.
41
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spouse.45 America Online, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment and Drudge filed a motion
to dismiss or transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction.46
The United States District Court granted America Online’s motion and denied Drudge’s
motion.47 In granting America Online’s motion for summary judgment, the court determined
that Congress intended for the Communications Decency Act to provide immunity for the
internet service provider “even where the [ISP] has an active, even aggressive role in making
available content prepared by others.”48 The court noted that such immunity was intended to
promote self-policing of internet service providers and extends “even where the self-policing is
unsuccessful or not even attempted.”49 Further, in denying Drudge’s motion to dismiss or
transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court found that Drudge satisfied the District of
Columbia Long-Arm statute.50
More significantly, the court found that Drudge did not qualify under the news gathering
exception of the Long-Arm statute, noting that “Drudge is not a reporter, journalist or
newsgatherer. He is, as he himself admits, simply a purveyor of gossip.” 51 Drudge referenced
that determination in his aforementioned tweet where he criticized the FFIA’s amended
definition of “covered journalist.” But, upon motions by both parties to compel discovery
including information regarding Drudge’s sources, the District Court assumed that Drudge
qualified for the reporters’ privilege under the First Amendment.52 That assumption is evidenced

45

Id. at 46.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 52.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 57.
51
Id.
52
See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 244-245 (D.D.C. 1999).
46
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in the finding that Blumenthal failed to meet his burden to compel Drudge’s disclosure by not
exhausting all reasonable alternative sources of the information.53
The court’s review of Drudge’s reporters’ privilege claim “without questioning or
discussing Drudge’s qualifications” demonstrates that Drudge was a newsperson for purposes of
the First Amendment despite not meeting the news gathering exception of the Long-Arm
statute.54 Ultimately the parties reached a settlement in which Blumenthal paid Drudge a sum of
money for travel costs.55 Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found “the Drudge
Report has evolved into a forum that shares similarities to traditional media” and used it as an
example of reporting that would satisfy the state’s shield law.56 Therefore it is clear that
Drudge’s tweets in which he infers he was deemed not a journalist are misguided in the context
of reporters’ privilege.
Reactions to Drudge’s criticism from those within legal and online communities show
that the FFIA provides reasonable protection to bloggers. Soon after Drudge’s comments,
several proponents of the bill’s impact on bloggers candidly responded.57 For example, Emily
Bazelon, Senior Research Fellow at Yale Law School and Senior Editor at online magazine
Slate, explained that protection under the bill’s recent amendment does not require work for
pay.58 While the precise word “blog” is not written in the bill, bloggers likely will be protected
as state shield laws with similar broad language to the FFIA’s have afforded such protection.59
Next, Wimmer also directly addressed Drudge’s mistaken insinuations that the bill would have a

53

Id. at 245.
See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering
Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 97,
136 (2002).
55
Id.
56
See Too Much Media, 206 N.J. at 237.
57
See Wimmer, supra note 36.
58
See Bazelon, supra note 15.
59
See Bazelon, supra note 15.
54
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negative impact on bloggers, stating “[w]ell, no. The bill does protect bloggers, which is why
the Online News Association supports it.”60
Furthermore, the FFIA’s judicial discretion provision resolves any lingering concerns that
the bill does not protect bloggers. This equitable provision states that a federal judge “may
exercise discretion to avail the person of the protections of this Act if… the judge determines that
such protections would be in the interest of justice and necessary to protect lawful and legitimate
news-gathering activities under the specific circumstances of the case.”61 Thus, even assuming a
blogger unfairly falls outside the scope of the aforementioned “covered journalist” provision,
fairness principles dictate that the judge provide protection. Stated differently, the amendment’s
broad judicial discretion provision allows a federal court to carry out justice when appropriate.
Wimmer suggested that implementing this safety valve in conjunction with the functional
approach provides reasonable protection to bloggers, writing that:
Some claim that anyone at all should be considered a journalist. But under this
bill, anyone can be covered as a journalist, as long as the writer is actually
committing journalism. Those who claim anyone at all must be covered are really
suggesting a poison pill to kill any privilege. It’s naïve to suggest that Congress
would pass a privilege that applies to everyone.62
Even some past skeptics have acknowledged the judicial discretion provision’s positive impact
on the protection afforded bloggers. For instance, David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney to digital
rights group Electronic Frontier Foundation, argued that the amendment’s judicial discretion
provision extends greater protection to bloggers than any previous federal shield bill, arguing
that:
The importance of this provision cannot be overstated. It provides an avenue for
non-mainstream and citizen journalists to demonstrate that they are deserving of
the shield, even if they otherwise fall outside the law’s strict definition of
60

See Wimmer, supra note 36.
See United States Senate: Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 12, 2013).
62
See Wimmer, supra note 36.
61
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“covered journalist.” Thus, those journalists who may not have been covered by
the 2009 law, such as first–time freelancers or self-publishers who cannot prove a
connection to an “entity,” are not automatically excluded.63
The judicial discretion section is an avenue vital to the reasonable coverage of the
blogosphere. It specifically empowers a federal judge to protect the legitimate newsgathering
performance. In conjunction with the “covered journalist” definition, the judicial discretion
provision authorizes a federal judge to achieve Congress’ intention of protecting the gathering
and transmission of news.

Federal courts are provided flexibility to cover the array of

independent and freelance bloggers who do not satisfy the plain language of a “covered
journalist” but nonetheless deserve protection pursuant to Congress’ intent. Accordingly, the
judicial discretion provision allows for elastic application of Congress’ intent within the
blogosphere.
In sum, the FFIA’s focus on the newsgathering function in its “covered journalist”
definition empowers a federal court to reasonably and accurately protect bloggers. The FFIA’s
judicial discretion provision furthers the bill’s flexible application to the blogosphere. Therefore,
Congress has effectively legislated to allow the judiciary’s appropriate protection of online
entities. Section IV will show that the FFIA likely would have covered bloggers who have been
left unprotected in the past without it.
Section IV
Bloggers have no Protection Absent the FFIA
Past instances involving bloggers unsuccessfully asserting reporters’ privilege indicate
that online entities would be better protected with the FFIA than without it. In a well-known
example, blogger and freelance video journalist Joshua Wolf was jailed for 226 days, the longest

63

See David Greene, Senate Revises Media Shield Law for the Better, But It’s Still Imperfect, EFF.org (Sep. 20,
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/senate-revises-media-shield-law-better-its-still-imperfect.
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incarceration of an American journalist in a contempt case.64 There, Wolf videotaped an anticapitalist protest in San Francisco and posted some of the footage on his website.65 Wolf was
subpoenaed by a federal grand jury to testify and to produce unreleased portions of the
videotape.66

The grand jury believed that Wolf’s unpublished footage might reveal the

perpetrators who allegedly set fire to a police car during the protest.67
In filing a motion to quash the subpoena, Wolf argued that the First Amendment afforded
him a shield to his newsgathering materials.68 The Ninth Circuit denied Wolf’s motion and
refused to “alter the long-established obligation of a reporter to comply with grand jury
subpoenas.”69 Notably, the court’s decision focused on privilege lacking under Branzburg, not
on whether Wolf was a journalist.70 Wolf still refused to produce the videotape and was jailed,
becoming the first blogger to be jailed for failing to comply with a grand jury subpoena. 71 Wolf
spent eight months in jail until his release once he provided the unpublished footage.72
Following his release, Joshua Wolf stated the government abandoning their demand that
he testify was essential to his compliance in turning over the unreleased videotape.73 Wolf spoke
to the importance of protecting journalists from being compelled to testify, reasoning that
“[j]ournalists absolutely have to remain independent of law enforcement. Otherwise, people will

64

See Stephanie B. Turner, Protecting Citizen Journalists: Why Congress Should Adopt A Broad Federal Shield
Law, 30 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 503 (2012).
65
See Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of A Reporter's
Privilege, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 385, 446 (2006).
66
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x 430, 431 (9th Cir. 2006).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 432.
69
Id. at 433.
70
See Eliason, supra note 65, at 446.
71
Id.
72
See Turner, supra note 64, at 503.
73
See Bob Egelko & Jim Herron Zamora, The Josh Wolf Case: Blogger Freed after Giving Video to Feds,
www.SFgate.com (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/THE-JOSH-WOLF-CASE-Blogger-freedafter-giving-2576757.php.
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never trust journalists.”74 Wolf further explained “[a]bsolutely this was worth it. I would do it
again if I had to” and he expressed “the need for a federal shield law that would protect
journalists, including bloggers, from having to disclose confidential sources or unpublished
material.”75
Wolf would have been provided such federal protection had the FFIA been in existence at
the time he was subpoenaed. A federal shield law covering those who “engage in journalist
activities such as gathering and disseminating news” would have protected Wolf’s right of
confidentiality to his sources and videotape.76 Moreover, the “mainstream media” has defended
Wolf, contending that “he is a journalist entitled to the protections of any applicable reporters’
privilege” and The Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press even “filed an amicus brief
on Wolf’s behalf.”77 Judith Miller, a journalist for the New York Times who likewise was held
in contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena, “expressed [her] solidarity as a fellow
journalist” in support of Wolf.78

Accordingly, the FFIA’s focus on intent to perform the

newsgathering function clearly places Wolf’s investigative footage and dissemination on his
website within its scope, irrespective of Wolf’s status as an independent freelance video
journalist and blogger.
Because the investigation of the protestors for which Wolf was subpoenaed involved a
criminal case,79 under the FFIA the government would have been required to make three
showings by a preponderance of the evidence.80 The prosecution would have had to show they
“exhausted all reasonable alternative sources” for the unpublished footage, that there were
74

Id.
Id.
76
See Turner, supra note 64, at 517.
77
See Eliason, supra note 65, at 446.
78
Id.
79
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x at 433.
80
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
75
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“reasonable grounds to believe a crime occurred,” and that there were “reasonable grounds to
believe” the unpublished footage was “essential to the resolution of the matter.”81 If successfully
proven, the burden would have shifted to Wolf to show by “clear and convincing evidence that
disclosure” of the unpublished footage “would be contrary to the public interest, taking into
account both the public interest in gathering and disseminating the news and maintaining the free
flow of information and the public interest in compelling disclosure” of the unpublished
footage.82 Rather, the prosecution was actually required to show by “clear and convincing
evidence that there was an authorized request for information by the grand jury, the information
sought was relevant to the proceeding, the information sought was not already in the
government’s possession, and Wolf failed to comply with the request.”83 The prosecution met its
burden to issue a grand jury subpoena to Wolf.84
Critically, the FFIA would have permitted Wolf to show that compelling disclosure of his
unpublished footage was contrary to the public interest.85 Wolf was unable to assert any such
statutory privilege absent the FFIA and was relegated to making constitutionally based
arguments which federal courts have routinely rejected since Branzburg.86 As such, Wolf’s right
of confidentiality in his unpublished recordings as a freelance video journalist and blogger would
have been better served under the FFIA. In that case, even after the government met its burden it
would have shifted to Wolf and provided an opportunity for him to argue a position not
customarily denied in federal court.

In other words, the blogger who was jailed under a

contempt order longer than any other American journalist to date may have avoided going to jail

81

See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
83
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x at 432.
84
Id.
85
See Tracking the U.S. Congress (May 16, 2013).
86
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App'x at 433.
82
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altogether had the FFIA been enacted. Wolf at least would have been more vindicated under the
FFIA by a court’s order in favor of the government and might have complied with the subpoena
at an earlier date.
However, the FFIA is not all encompassing as it “bites as WikiLeaks.” 87 WikiLeaks was
launched in 2006 by Julian Assange and has “released hundreds of thousands of confidential
government documents relating to a wide variety of subject.”88

WikiLeaks releases have

involved “U.S. standard operating procedure in Guantanamo Bay, secret Scientology ‘bibles,’
Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! Account, footage of a July 2007 Baghdad airstrike that killed Iraqi
journalists, and over 75,000 previously unpublished documents about the war in Afghanistan.”89
WikiLeaks entry “into the national consciousness has introduced a new sense of urgency
to the debate about the proper scope of blogger protection.”90 The FFIA has resolved that debate
with a section that directly addresses online entities like WikiLeaks. Specifically, that section of
the FFIA excludes from its coverage “any person or entity whose principal function… is to
publish primary source documents that have been disclosed to such person or entity without
authorization.”91 Critics of this section contend that WikiLeaks “has played a big watchdog
role” but acknowledge “it’s not worth killing the bill over this clause.”92 WikiLeaks “actually
could be covered, by doing more editing, so that it’s not just about document dumps.”93
Accordingly, entering the realm of investigative journalism may allow WikiLeaks to invoke
privilege under the FFIA.

87

See Bazelon, supra note 15.
See John P. Borger, Patrick L. Groshong, Ashley Kissinger, Joseph R. Larsen, et. al., Recent Developments in
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In conclusion, Josh Wolf epitomizes the blogosphere’s need for the FFIA. Wolf’s right
of confidentiality is vindicated under the FFIA and a federal court would have been practically
authorized to quash the subpoena. Also while WikiLeaks is pointedly excluded from the bill’s
scope, there is a clear opportunity for WikiLeaks to conform to the newsgathering function
requirement. These prior instances represent the need for the FFIA to protect online entities.
Next, Section V contends that similarly constructed state shield laws suggest the FFIA would
appropriately protect bloggers.
Section V
Similarly Constructed State Shield Laws Sufficiently Protect Bloggers
Several state courts have afforded online entities coverage under state shield statutes.
Prior to the Branzburg decision, media shield laws had already been instituted in seventeen states
across the country.94 This section will examine state court interpretations of media shield laws
and will argue that bloggers’ would be afforded similar protection under the FFIA in federal
court.
The initial case addressing whether a state shield law considered bloggers as journalists
was adjudicated in California.95 There, in O’Grady v. Superior Court, Jason O’Grady provided
news and information about software and hardware for Apple computers via “O’Grady’s
PowerPage,” his owned and operated online news magazine.96 Apple claimed that O’Grady was
liable for misappropriation of trade secrets after he posted four articles to the website which
discussed “a rumored new product that Apple was about to release which would facilitate the
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recording of digital live sound on Apple computers.”97 Apple sought a subpoena compelling
O’Grady to reveal his sources but the court denied Apple’s application, finding that O’Grady had
a right of confidentiality in his sources.98
The court addressed that the state legislature contemplated protection of websites such as
O’Grady’s PowerPage, since the website was “highly analogous to printed publications” which
were protected under the shield law.99 The court was persuaded that websites such as O’Grady’s
employed “a kind and degree of editorial control” akin to printed publications which were
already protected under the statute.100 For instance, only O’Grady, not anonymous posters, was
capable of posting the four articles at issue to O’Grady’s PowerPage.101
The state court’s decision in O’Grady shows that a statutory concentration on
functionality empowers a court to protect bloggers’ right of confidentiality. The court found no
“colorable ground for declaring [O’Grady’s] activities not to be legitimate newsgathering and
dissemination.” Further, the court explained “[i]f [O’Grady’s] activities and social function
differ at all from those of traditional print and broadcast journalists, the distinctions are minute,
subtle, and constitutionally immaterial.”102 Even Randall D. Eliason, who opposes enactment of
a federal media shield, postulated that “[a] functional approach to determining who qualifies as a
journalist, similar to the approach followed by the court in O’Grady, is the solution most
consistent with the values purportedly protected by the privilege.”103 O’Grady’s evaluation
under California’s shield law of functional analogues between bloggers and traditional media
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outlets, such as editorial control, parallels an analysis under the FFIA of one’s intent to gather
and disseminate news.

Accordingly, the O’Grady court’s finding suggests that had those

identical facts been adjudicated in federal court pursuant to the FFIA his right of confidentiality
would have likewise been preserved.
Next, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale
similarly indicates that the FFIA would reasonably provide federal protection of bloggers’ right
of confidentiality. Too Much Media considered the scope of online speakers covered by New
Jersey’s shield law.104

The court specifically decided “whether the newspersons’ privilege

extends to a self-described journalist who posted comments on an internet message board.”105
Hale made allegedly defamatory statements on Oprano.com, an online platform where anyone
with internet access could post unfiltered comments about the adult entertainment industry.106
Hale decided to investigate “criminal activity in the online adult entertainment industry” after
she was exposed to “cyber flashers” while working as a life coach.107 Her investigation focused
on a security breach of Too Much Media’s database.108 Hale’s detailed probe of the breach
consisted of interviewing people in the adult entertainment industry, collecting information from
porn blogs, speaking with the offices of the Washington State Attorney General, and attending
six adult industry trade shows.109 Hale then posted the statements at issue on Oprano’s message
board and Too Much Media filed suit, demanding information about the sources upon which
Hale relied.110
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The New Jersey Supreme Court found that Hale did not fall within the state shield law’s
scope of coverage.111 New Jersey’s shield law protected “a person engaged on, engaged in,
connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring,
transmitting, compiling, editing, or disseminating news for the general public.”112 The court
recognized that the statute’s application was not limited to traditional news sources, though it
required the means of disseminating news to be similar to “newspapers, magazines, and the
like.”113 As such, the court concluded that Hale’s sources were not protected because her
postings to the Oprano message board were “not the functional equivalent of the types of news
media outlets outlined in the shield law.”114 The court explained that “message boards are little
more than forums for conversation” and “[n]either writing a letter to the editor nor posting
comment on an online message board establishes the connection with “news media” required by
the statute.115
While Hale was not covered by New Jersey’s shield law, Too Much Media nonetheless
provided that digital media providers may qualify for protection. The court recognized “[c]ertain
online sites could satisfy the law's standards.”116 Specifically, the court explained that “[a] single
blogger might qualify for coverage under the Shield Law provided [that blogger meets] the
statute's criteria” but determined that Hale’s circumstances did not meet the statute’s required
nexus to “news media.”117 In delineating the types of online sites that would satisfy New Jersey
shield law’s standards, the court used California’s decision in O’Grady v. Superior Court as an
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example.118 The court explained that O’Grady protected comments by a website operator on an
open and deliberate publication of his news oriented website, rendering the website
“conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a newspaper” under California’s shield law.119
The court further clarified that O’Grady “pointedly contrasted the site with the deposit of
information, opinion, or fabrication by a casual visitor to an open forum such as a newsgroup,
chat room, bulletin board system, or discussion group.”120 Too Much Media’s recognition of
those distinctions in O’Grady exemplifies that protection under either state shield law depended
on whether the blogger performed the journalistic function, like editorial control of the news’
dissemination.
Accordingly, the FFIA is similar in construction and application to the shield laws
examined in Too Much Media and O’Grady. The Too Much Media court’s example of O’Grady
as a blogger who would have satisfied New Jersey’s shield law shows similar statutory
interpretations in both states. Both shield laws “resemble the functional approach in that they
cover individuals who engage in journalist activities.”121 Too Much Media was not convinced
that Hale exercised “editorial control over Oprano” and deemed “her contributions were like
letters to the editor that simply comment on articles.”122 Those courts’ concentration under the
shield laws on editorial control parallels the FFIA’s intent to perform the newsgathering function
addressed in Section III of this paper.
Importantly, it is unreasonable to expect all online entities to be protected by a state or
federal shield law. As Bazelon and Wimmer have posited, it’s unrealistic to visualize a shield
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law which grants anyone a blanket exemption from court orders.123 The New Jersey shield law
in Too Much Media protected bloggers who performed the newsgathering function and
appropriately found that Hale did not satisfy that requirement. On that note, Editor-in-Chief of
Loyola Law School’s law review Joshua Rich explained that:
A blogger who follows these standards should fall under the definition of a
journalist who merits shield-law protection. But a message-board commenter like
Shellee Hale, who fails to give his or her subject the opportunity to respond to
attacks-- among other journalistic failures--should not qualify for the privilege.124
Further, Too Much Media identified that the shield law’s “similarity standard” requiring the
blog’s dissemination of information to be similar to the dissemination of information by
traditional news media “would cover many other citizen journalists.”125 Consequently, a shield
law’s concentration on performing the newsgathering function permits a wide enough scope of
coverage to protect deserving online entities.
The state shield laws application in Too Much Media and O’Grady demonstrate that the
FFIA would cover online entities deserving of protection. Too Much Media would have likely
been decided the same on the merits in federal court under the FFIA because posts to a message
board do not rise to the standard of “primary intent to investigate events and procure
materials.”126 Blogs over which editorial control is exerted “do not facilitate the journalistic
function in the same way” as “message boards and other online media through which citizen
journalists might disseminate information--such as chat rooms, instant messaging platforms, and
Facebook.” The Too Much Media court expressed concern that “anyone with a Facebook
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account could try to assert the privilege.”127 The distinction pursuant to a functional standard
between blogging and merely posting content would operate no differently in federal court under
the FFIA’s intent requirement. Thus, those who satisfy the FFIA’s requirement would abide by
journalistic standards in turn fostering efficient newsgathering.
Last, the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v.
Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc. signifies judicial willingness to protect online entities and
users.

There, the court considered an online entity’s constitutionally based argument for

qualified reporters’ privilege.128 Plaintiff Mortgage Specialists, Inc. (“Mortgage Specialists”)
was a mortgage lender and Defendant Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc. (“Implode”)
operated a website which ranked businesses in the mortgage industry.129 Implode’s website,
www.ml-implode.com, categorized “at risk” companies and permitted registered users “to post
publicly viewable comments about lenders.”130 Implode published an article in 2008 which
discussed actions taken by the New Hampshire Banking Department against Mortgage
Specialists and incorporated a link purporting to represent Mortgage Specialists’ 2007 loan
figures.131 An anonymous user registered to the website, “Brianbattersby,” responded to the
publication with two comments about Mortgage Specialists and its President.132
Mortgage Specialists filed for injunctive relief and alleged that the comments by
“Brianbattersby” were defamatory and false.133

After the trial court granted Mortgage

Specialists’ relief, Implode argued on appeal that “ordering it to disclose the identities of the
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Loan Chart source and Brianbattersby's postings” infringed both the First Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and New Hampshire’s Constitution.134 In vacating and remanding the trial
court’s ordered disclosure of the Loan Chart’s source, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
found that the trial court failed to consider the applicability of the qualified newsgathering
privilege.135

The court determined that Implode was a reporter for purposes of the

newsgathering privilege as “Implode's website serves an informative function and contributes to
the flow of information to the public.”136

Thus, Implode was a “legitimate publisher of

information” and “[t]he fact that Implode operates a website makes it no less a member of the
press.”137
Additionally, the court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order requiring the
disclosure of Brianbattersby’s identity.138 The court espoused “a standard for trial courts to
apply when a plaintiff requests disclosure of the identity of an anonymous defendant who has
posted allegedly defamatory material on the Internet.”139 That test requires the trial court to
“balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech” against “the
necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to
properly proceed.”140
This case shows the judiciary’s readiness to enforce a newsgathering privilege. While
Mortgage Specialists was not decided on the merits, the court nonetheless concentrated on
Implode’s legitimate newsgathering performance and directly found its status as a website was
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immaterial. There was not even a statutory basis for the court’s finding as the newsgathering
privilege was invoked pursuant to the Constitution.141 Moreover, the court even found it within
their power to extend the privilege to a third party poster “Brianbattersby” upon remand.142 It is
likely that under the FFIA Implode’s right of confidentiality in the Loan Chart source and
Brianbattersby's identity would have been preserved as Implode performed according to
journalistic standards by exhibiting editorial control.
Overall, the foregoing state decisions suggest that the internet community should
embrace the FFIA.

The courts’ findings in New Jersey and California exemplify the

blogosphere’s protection under similarly constructed state shield laws. The New Hampshire
court’s analysis of reporters’ privilege under constitutional parameters shows judicial readiness
to preserve journalists’ right of confidentiality even without a shield law. These cases make it
reasonably foreseeable that the FFIA will protect bloggers in federal court.
Section VI
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to support the position that online entities within the
blogosphere would be appropriately protected under the FFIA. As previously discussed, the
news media’s unsuccessful litigation in federal courts over recent years has prompted resort to
Congress for protection. The FFIA’s plain language overcomes reservations about enacting a
federal media shield and thus affords protection to deserving bloggers. Previous instances in
which bloggers have futilely asserted reporters’ privilege would have been more meritorious

141
142

Id. at 232.
Id.

26

under the FFIA. Finally, similarly constructed state shield laws that were found to protect
deserving bloggers suggest the FFIA would be interpreted no differently in federal courts.
Therefore, the online community should excuse the FFIA’s negligible flaws and support its
institution.
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